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,June 1957] MAR'riN Sea. OF AviATIOX v. BA?\'K OF' "\mmrcA o8!1 
[48 C.2d 689; 312 P.2d 251] 
[L.A. _:\io. 24459. In Bank. June 21, 19;17.] 
1\IARTIN SCHOOL OF AVIATION, INC. (a Corporation), 
Apprllant, v. BANK OF Al\1EHICA NA'riONAIJ 
TRCST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIA'I'ION (a National 
Assoeiation , as Executor, etc., Hespondent. 
[1] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Extent of Power of 
Court.--\Vhen findings of fact are attacked on the ground 
that thPre ifi not any substantial evidence to sustain them, 
the power of an appellate court hegins nnd ends with the 
determination whether there is any substantial evidence, con-
tl'adieted or uncontradicted, that will support the findings. 
[2] Aeronautics-Injuries to Aircraft--Evidence.-ln a bailor's 
action against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented 
airplane which crashed, findings that the bailee and pilot 
agreed they would not take the plane from the ground if the 
weather was not good and did not agree that the plane would 
not he taken from the ground "until after daybreak" were 
sustained by a report filed by a man, experienced in aviation 
matters, with the Civil Aeronautics Authority on the dny of 
the accident, in which he stated that the bailee and pilot made 
nrrnngrments to use the plane to go on a dove hunting trip, 
thnt they wanted to leave and return early in order to get the 
hunting over before it was too hot, that the pilot told him 
"he would check the weather before leaving and wouldn't go 
if the weather was not good," and that, aftee lE~arning of the 
aecident, the investigator "found it was a complete washout" 
and that "It is impossible for me to figure out what could have 
caused this accident as the ship went iu at a great speed and 
nearly straight in." 
[3] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact--Consideration of Evi-
dence.-Evidence and inferences in conflict with evidence in 
support of findings of fact must be disregnrded by the Supreme 
Court on appeal, in considering sufficiency of evidence to sus-
tain findings. 
[4] Aeronautics-Injuries to Aircraft-Evidence.-ln a bailor's 
action against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented 
airplane which erashed, a finding that when the flight started 
"the weather was good at the time" wns sustained by evidPnce 
that the sky was clear above 2,000 feet, that the pilot wns an 
experienced instrument flyer, and that the only possibly 
[2] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Aviation,§ 26; Am.Jur., Aviation,§ 26. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1235; [2, 4-6] 
Aeronautics, § 3; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1242; [7] Trial, § 380. 
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unfavorable weather condition was a cloud bank of about 1,200 
foot depth above the airfield at the time of takeoff, it not being 
necessary for visual flight conditions to prevail in order that 
flying weather be "good." 
[5] !d.-Injuries to Aircraft-Evidence.-In a bailor's action 
against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented air-
plane which crashed, a finding that the plane was not operated 
negligently was sustained by the absence of any evidence that 
the bailee was negligent, that the terms of the bailment were 
breached, or that there was a conversion, and by an investi-
gator's report to the Civil Aeronautics Authority that "It is 
impossible for me to figure out what could have caused this 
accident to happen as the ship went in at a great speed and 
nearly straight in." 
[6] !d.-Injuries to Aircraft-New TriaL-In a bailor's action 
against the bailee's executor for destruction of a rented air-
plane which crashed, the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the bailor's motion for a new trial where, 
during argument at the close of the trial, the judge expressed 
the opinion that the bailment contract contained a condition 
as to daylight departure and that the condition was violated, 
and the court then, on its own motion, reopened the case for 
further evidence on the issue of visibility and the meaning of 
"daylight," and where the bailor had ample opportunity to 
introduce its evidence prior to submission of the case, addi-
tional evidence regarding the terms of the bailment contract 
was introduced, and the case was twice continued for further 
evidence. 
[7] Trial-Findings-Expressions of Judge as Impeaching.-The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute the decision, 
which is the final deliberate expression of the court; expres-
sions of a judge during trial cannot be considered for the 
purpose of contradicting deliberate findings and conclusions 
that he subsequently makes and files. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frederick F. Houser, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover damages for value of an airplane which 
was destroyed in an accident. Judgment for defendant af-
firmed. 
\Viuthrop 0. Gordou aud Nathan \V. 'l'al'l' for Appellant. 
"William ,] Cnsad\. for l{t>Spo!Hleut. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §§ 174, 232; Am.Jur., 'rrial, §§ 1145, 1147 
et seq. 
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McCOMB, ,J.~-From a judgment in favor of dPfendant 
after trial before the court in an action to recover damages 
for the destnwtion of its airplane, plaintiff appeal:;;. 
Pacts: Plainiiff, Martin R(~hool of Aviation, Inc., a eorpo-
ration, sues as assignee of a partnership eonsisting of Floyd 
R. Martin, ,Joseph G. Hager and ,J. W. Martin, Jr., which 
had been doing business under the firm name of Martin School 
of Aviation. Defendant is sued as executor of the estate of 
Charles E. Rhoades, deceased. Hereafter the partnership 
will be referred to as plaintiff and decedent Rhoades as de-
fendant. 
Plaintiff owned an instrument-equipped Bonanza airplane 
which it rented to defendant for a flight to the Imperial 
Valley. Arrangements were made for defendant by 0. A. 
Kier, an experienced and competent pilot, who acted as pilot 
of the plane. 'Within three minutes after the flight com-
menced the plane crashed. Defendant, the pilot and C. 0. 
Gregg, all occupants of the plane, were killed. 
The amended complaint in three counts alleges: (1) that 
the bailment was made to defendant upon condition that 
''they would not take, or cause said plane to be taken, off 
from the ground until after daybreak and unless the weather 
was clear"; that the plane took off before daybreak and 
before the weather was clear, and that it was so negligently 
operated as to cause it to crash to the ground; (2) after 
incorporating by reference the averments as to the terms of 
the rental conditions, that defendant ''failed to return said 
airplane to plaintiffs in violation of their said agreement of 
bailment, and wrongfully breached said agreement of bail-
ment to plaintiffs' damage"; and (3) after incorporating the 
previous averments of the terms of the bailment, that defend-
ant "promised to return said airplane in good condition and 
wilfully and negligently failed and refused to return said 
airplane to plaintiffs and converted the same to his own use." 
The trial court found that: 
(a) Defendant and Pilot Kier agreed that they would not 
take or cause said plane to be taken from the ground if the 
weather was not good; 
(b) Defendant and Pilot Kier did not agree that the 
plane would not be taken from the ground "until after day-
break''; 
(c) When the flight started "the weather was good at 
that time"; 
(d) 'l'he plane was not operated nrgligently; 
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The terms of the bailment were not breached; and 
(f) '!'here was no conversion. 
(Jucstions: ] 1 irst. Was there substantial evidence to sup-
port the trial court's findings (a), (b), (c) and (d), supra? 
[1] This question must be answered in the affirmative, 
awl is governed by this rule : vVhen findings of fact are at-
tacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence 
to sustain them, the power of an appellate court begins and 
ends with the determination as to whether there is any sub-
stantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that will 
support the findings of fact. (Primrn v. P1·irnrn, 46 Cal.2d 
690, 693 ll] [299 P.2d 231] .) 
Applying this rule to the present case, a recital of a 
portion of the evidence with reference to each of the ques-
tioned findings discloses substantial evidence to support them: 
[2] Ji'indings (a) and (b). John Martin, a man experi-
enced in aviation matters and in investigating accidents with 
the Civil Aeronautics Authority, on the day of the accident 
filed a report with the C.A.A. which was received in evi-
dence. The material portion reads: "Mr. Rhoades and Red 
Kier made arrangements to use our Bonanza N8632A to go to 
Brawley, California, on a dove hunting trip and wanted to 
leave and return early in order to get the hunting over before 
it got too hot in Brawley. Kier told rne he would check the 
weather befm·e leaving and wouldn't go if the weather was 
not good. I was called at home about 5 :45 a. m. by my 
brother and he said the airport guard called and said that 
he thought ICier had cracked up. I left at once for the scene 
of the accident and found it was a complete washout and was 
not anything left of value. All three persons in the airplane 
were killed. It is impossible for me to figure out what could 
have caused this accident as the ship went in at a, great speed 
a,nd nearly stmight in. The only information I have is what 
people in the vicinity had to say." (Italics added.) 
Clearly, the italicized portion of Mr. Martin's statement and 
the absence of any other evidence as to weather conditions 
before the plane >YaR taken into the air constituted substantial 
evidence to sustain the trial court's questioned findings (a) 
and (b). [3] Conflicting evidence and inferences must, of 
course, be disregarded by this court. (See Prirnm v. Primm, 
supm, p. 694 [2] .) 
[ 4] Finding (c). The evidence established that at the 
time of takeoff there was a cloud bank above the airfield and 
surrounding area, with the ceiling being somewhere between 
.) mw 1 !!:ill ~lARTIN Sn1. ov A nATIO;-;: v. BANK ov A orERWA ri~J:3 
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200 ancl 1,000 feeL 'l'he offieial weather repol'1s placed the 
ceiling at about 800 feet. Horizontal visibility was estimaterl 
at from one to seven miles, and there was no fog. The top 
of the elond layer was approximately 2,000 frrt, and above 
that level the skies were clear and visibility unrestricted. 
'fhe following Air Traffic Control Regulations (Code of 
l~'ederal Regulations, tit. 14, pt. 60) apply to intrastate as well 
as interstate flights and prescribe, among other things, mini-
mum safe altitudes and rules for visual and instrument flights 
with rrspect to ceilings and cloud formations: 
Sec·tion 60.17 prescribes minimum safe altitudes. So far as 
pertinrnt here it rPads: "Minimum safe altitudes. Except 
whrn nPcessary for take-off or landing, no person shall oper-
ate an aircraft below the following altitnd<~s: ... (h) Over 
congr·strd areas. Over the congested areas of <;ities, towns or 
settlements, or over an open-air assembly of persons, an alti-
tude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstaele 1riihin a hori-
zontal radius of 2,000 feet from the aircraft. . . . (c) Over 
other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above 
the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated 
areas. In such event, the aircraft shall not be operated closer 
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure .... 
(d) IFR operations. The minimum IFR altitude established 
by the Administrator for that portion of the route over which 
the operation is condueted .... " 
The Visual Flight Rules are prescribed by sertion 60.30, 
whirh read: "Ccili11g and distance [Tom clouds. Aircraft 
shall comply with the following requirements as to ceiling 
and distance from clouds: (a) Within control zones. Unless 
authorized by air traffic control, aircraft shall not be flown 
when the ceiling is less than J ,000 feet, or less than 500 feet 
Yertically and 2,000 feet horizontally from any cloud forma-
tion. (b) Elsewhere. ·when at an altitude of more than 700 
fret above the snrfaee aircraft shall not be flown lrss than 500 
feet vertically and 2,000 feet horizontally from any cloud for-
mation; wben at an altitude of 700 fret or less aircraft shall 
not be flown nnless clear of clouds." 
Ceiling is defined in section 60.72: "Ceiling. The distance 
from the surface of thf~ ground or water to the lowest cloud 
layer reported as 'broken clouds' or 'ovrrr,ast.' " 
"IFR" means instrument flight rules (§ 60.82), and "IFR 
<·onditions" arr~ defined as: "Wrather r'onditions below the 
minimum preseribed for flights under VPR.'' ( § 60.83.) 
"VFR conditions" are defined as: ""Weather conditions equal 
()!)4 MARTIN ScH. m' AviATION v. BANK OF AMERICA [ 48 0.2d 
to or above the minimum prescribed for flights under VFR.'' 
(§60.89.) 
Section 60.41 reads: "IFR flight p~an. Prior to take-off 
from a point within a control zone or prior to entering a 
control area or control zone, a flight plan shall be filed with 
air traffic control. ... " 
It is to be noted that there was no evidence that the path of 
flight was to go through congested areas within the meaning 
of the Visual Flight Rules. If the ceiling was 800 to 1,000 
feet the airplane could fly at an altitude up to 700 feet and 
still comply with those rules if no control zones or congested 
areas were involved. 
It is not necessary for visual flight conditions to prevail 
in order that the flying weather be "good." There is a 
difference between ''good'' weather and ''clear'' weather in 
this regard. ''In 'clear weather,' when the pilots can navi-
gate their planes by 'pilotage,' that is, by visual operation 
from markings and landmarks along the airways, and can 
clrarly see other aircraft or obstructions in time to avoid 
collision, flights may be governed by the Visual Flight Rules.'' 
(Wilson & Bryan, Air Transportation (1949), p. 160.) It 
may be "good" flight weather even though it is not "clear" 
within this definition. 
In the instant case the sky was clear above 2,000 feet, there 
was no evidence of any frontal activity or local turbulence in 
the air, and the only possibly unfavorable weather condition 
was the cloud bank of about 1,200 foot depth. The pilot was 
an experienced instrument flyer, and a bank of stratus at such 
a ceiling is not bad weather for an instrument-rated pilot in 
an instrument-equipped plane. Thus, even if visual flying 
('Onditions did not prevail, there was no showing that the pilot 
did not comply with the Instrument Flight Rules or that the 
weather was not "good" for an instrument flight. Under 
these drcumstances it cannot be said as a matter of law 
i hat it was not "good" flying weather, and the foregoing 
evidence fully sustains the trial court's finding (c). 
[5] Finding (d). There is a total absence of any evidence 
that defendant was negligent, or that the terms of the bail-
mrnt wet·e breached, or that there was a conversion. The 
trial court's finding on these points is sustained by Mr. 
Martin's report to the C.A.A. set forth above, wherein he 
said, "It is impossible for me to :figure out what could have 
caused this accident as the ship went in at a great speed and 
nearly straight in.'' 
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[6] Second: Did the trial court abuse its rliscret£on 1:11 
denying plaintiff's rnotion for a new tr·ial? 
No. Plaintiff contends that it was surprised and misled by 
the court into not introducing certain evidence. During the 
argument at the close of the trial the judge expressed the 
opinion that the bailment contract contained a condition as to 
daylight departure and that the condition was violated. The 
court then, on its own motion, reopened the case for further 
evidence on the issue of visibility and the meaning of tJp~ 
word "daylight." 
The record shows that plaintiff bad ample opportunity 
to introduce its evidence prior to submission of the case, as 
the judge made clear his willingness to hear any evidence 
offered, and additional evidence regarding the terms of the 
bailment contract was actually introduced. The case was 
twice continued for further evidence, and after submission 
the trial court made the findings set forth above. 
[7] The findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute 
the decision, which is the final deliberate expression of the 
court. Expressions of a judge during the trial cannot be 
considered for the purpose of contradicting deliberate find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law that he subsequently makes 
and files. (Strudth.off v. Yates, 28 Cal.2d 602, 615 [5] [170 
P.2d 873]; DeCotr v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 751 [7] [214 P. 
444]; People v. Driggs, 111 Oal.App. 42, 44 [1] [295 P. 51].) 
It thus appears that there was no ground for granting a 
new trial and that the trial judge's action in denying the 
motion was correct. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spenee, J., con-
eurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I adopt herewith as my dissenting opiniOn in the above 
entitled case the able and learned opinion written by 1Vlr. 
Justice Ashburn of the District Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division 'fwo, and whieh is reported in 
(Cal.App.) 303 P.2d 1084. 
For the reasons stated therein, I would reverse the judg-
ment. 
